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  Where (in the World) do Children Belong?  
 
Ann Laquer Estin* 
 
Many children live in families that form and extend and dissolve 
across international borders. The question of where these children 
“belong” is complicated, with different answers in different contexts. 
Belonging is sometimes determined in formal terms, based on citizen-
ship or legal immigration status. Belonging is sometimes a matter of 
fact, as with the “habitual residence” concept used in the Hague 
Children’s Conventions. Belonging may be understood more subjec-
tively, as a matter of identity and affiliation, based on daily life or ties 
of family, culture, language, and heritage. Belonging can be simply a 
matter of the child’s presence in a place. Children in the global village 
rarely belong to just one place, and, in general, the broadest concep-
tion of where children belong helps to assure that governments will act 
to protect their welfare. When different claims of belonging come into 
conflict, parents and authorities should seek to understand, respect and 
protect children’s multiple and diverse affiliations.     
 
For children who grow up in closely knit communities, rooted in a 
particular place, the question of belonging is an easy one. In these 
places, common ties of language, culture, religion, and family foster a 
deep and layered sense of connection. Other children grow up belong-
ing to multiple places and different communities, often geographically 
dispersed and sometimes spanning the globe. For children in global 
families, the question of belonging raises many troubling questions at 
the intersection of immigration law, family law, and international law.   
Laws in the United States take three distinct approaches to the 
question of where children belong. One definition of belonging turns 
on citizenship or immigration status, another looks to the place where 
the child is at home or “habitually resident,” and a third asks only if 
the child is present within the geographic borders of the state. Al-
though each of these three approaches applies in a different sphere, 
they regularly come into conflict.  
With this essay, I argue that we can best serve the interests of 
                                                 
* Aliber Family Chair in Law, University of Iowa. Prepared for the Symposium on Belonging, 
Families, and Family Law, BYU Law School, Jan. 28, 2011. 
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children in global circumstances by adopting a broad conception of be-
longing, based on the principle that children have a right to the care 
and protection of their parents and the different communities in which 
they belong. In circumstances of conflict, courts, agencies, govern-
ments, and parents should seek to understand, respect, and protect 
children’s many affiliations, including their ties to people and places 
that may be far away. Part I describes the three approaches to belong-
ing reflected in our laws and notes some of the areas of conflict be-
tween these approaches. Part II sketches an argument for respecting 
children’s affiliations in their full breadth, depth, and complexity, 
drawn both from principles of constitutional law and from internation-
al human rights. 
 
I.  CITIZENSHIP, RESIDENCE, AND PRESENCE 
 
Traditional Anglo-American doctrine placed jurisdiction over the 
child’s custody and welfare in the place where the child was domi-
ciled, while the civil law tradition looked to the country of citizen-
ship.1 In both systems, children’s identity depended on their fathers, 
just as a married woman’s domicile and nationality followed her hus-
band’s, defining with relative clarity where a family belonged.2 More 
modern approaches recognized that women should have equal rights to 
establish a domicile or nationality and equal rights with respect to the 
nationality of their children. One result has been many more families 
with multiple and mixed citizenship or residence and multiple places 
of belonging. Rules based on nationality and domicile continue to 
weave through our jurisprudence, along with a strand that traces to the 
parens patriae notion that the state bears responsibility for the welfare 
of children present within its borders.  
 
A.  Belonging Based on Citizenship 
 
American immigration and nationality laws seem generous in their 
treatment of children. We extend full citizenship to children born 
within our geographic borders,3 to children born abroad with a U.S.-
                                                 
1 See Adair Dyer, The Internationalization of Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 
635–36 (1997). 
2 See Ann Laquer Estin, Families and Children in International Law: An Introduction, 12 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 295–300 (2002). 
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1994), which is based on Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction the-
reof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV.  
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citizen parent,4 and to many children who are adopted by U.S. citi-
zens.5 These rules extend membership on the basis of family ties or 
place of birth, but they also suggest the importance of social or com-
munity affiliation. Thus, a child cannot inherit U.S. citizenship unless 
one or both parents have lived for a period of time in the United 
States.6  
 Children who are not U.S. citizens may have lawful permanent 
resident (“LPR”) status.7 This extends the right to stay indefinitely in 
the United States but is less secure than citizenship. Despite what may 
be lifelong ties, an individual with LPR status is subject to removal 
from the United States in cases of a criminal conviction.8 Non-citizen 
children without LPR status may be lawfully present on temporary, 
nonimmigrant visas, or they may have no legal status. Undocumented 
immigrant children are particularly vulnerable to disruption of their 
family or community ties in the United States.9 
We extend citizenship readily to children for important reasons, 
but that citizenship is less complete than adult citizenship, granting 
child citizens fewer rights than adult citizens.10 Children’s immigration 
status is usually derivative, following the status of their parents.11 Al-
though parents are generally able to extend their status to their child-
ren, citizen-children do not have the right to petition for their parents 
until after they reach adulthood.12 When parents who are undocu-
mented or out of status are removed from the United States, the fact 
that they have citizen children is not a basis for cancellation of remov-
al. As a result, children who are citizens are very often deported along 
with their parents.13  
                                                 
4 Id. § 1401(c)–(e), (g). 
5 Child Citizenship Act of 2000, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2000); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 320, 322 
(2003).  
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c), (g); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), (c). This is one of the under-
lying issues in United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2009), which was argued 
in the United States Supreme Court on November 10, 2010. 
7 8 U.S.C. § 1101(20) (2010). See generally David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradic-
tions: Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family Law in the Context of Child Custody, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 453, 476 (2008). 
8 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2008); see also Thronson, supra note 7, at 476. 
9 Undocumented children have some legal protection based on their presence in the United 
States. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (equal protection/school attendance); see also 
infra Part I.C. 
10 This is true as a matter of civic personhood, most notably the limitation of voting rights 
to citizens age eighteen or older. 
11 See David B. Thronson, Kids Will be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s 
Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 991–95 (2002). 
12 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A) (2009). 
13 See generally Jacqueline Bhabha, The “Mere Fortuity of Birth”? Children, Mothers, 
Borders and the Meaning of Citizenship, in MIGRATION AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, 
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Courts in many nations take jurisdiction on the basis of nationality 
in family law or personal status matters concerning children. This can 
be problematic when children, or their parents, are dual citizens, and 
when different family members have different citizenship or immigra-
tion status. These differences pose impossible challenges in some in-
ternational custody cases, particularly when one parent is not permit-
ted to enter or reside in the country where the child lives.14 
 
B.  Belonging Based on Residence 
 
Although traditional approaches to child custody jurisdiction 
looked to the child’s place of domicile or nationality, the modern view 
recognizes a variety of appropriate grounds for jurisdiction.15 This in-
creased the likelihood that several states or countries might have con-
current authority in custody matters, generating enormous conflict of 
laws problems. Both in the United States and internationally, current 
practice seeks to reduce these conflicts by assigning jurisdictional 
priority to a child’s “home state” or “habitual residence.” In most 
states, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA)16 governs jurisdiction in child custody and child protection 
matters. The UCCJEA treats a state where a child has lived for six 
months prior to the commencement of custody proceedings as the 
child’s “home state” for jurisdictional purposes.17 A court may take 
jurisdiction on this basis without regard to the nationality or immigra-
tion status of the child or his or her parents.18 When the child’s “home 
state” is in another state or a foreign country, however, the statute 
limits state courts to exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                             
BORDERS, AND GENDER 187 (Selya Benahbib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009); David B. Thronson, 
Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165 (2006); 
Sonja Starr & Lea Brillmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 259–67 (2003). 
14 Bhabha, supra note 13, at 202–06. 
15 See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES § 12.5 (Student 2d ed. 1988); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 
15.39 (4th ed. 2004); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971 & 
1988 rev.). 
16 UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 102(4), 9 U.L.A. 662 
(1999) [hereinafter UCCJEA]. 
17 Id. § 201(a). This section governs jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determi-
nation. Different rules apply if a court in another state or a foreign country has already made a 
child-custody determination under jurisdictional circumstances that are consistent with the 
UCCJEA. 
18 Adoption of Peggy, 767 N.E.2d 29, 35–38 (Mass. 2002); Arteaga v. Texas Dep’t of 
Protective and Regulatory Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); In re Stephanie 
M., 867 P.2d 706, 713–17 (Cal. 1994). Cf. In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 89 (Neb. 2009) 
(stating that the state court has jurisdiction despite fact that parent faced deportation). 
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even if the child holds U.S. citizenship.19    
At an international level, the Hague Children’s Conventions allo-
cate responsibility for decisions regarding children to the child’s place 
of habitual residence.20 The United States currently participates in the 
Child Abduction Convention21 and the Intercountry Adoption Conven-
tion22 and has been moving toward ratification of the Child Support 
Convention23 and the Child Protection Convention.24 Beyond the Ha-
gue Conventions, the United Nations Guidelines for the Alternative 
Care of Children, adopted in February 2010, provide that  
 
[a]ll decisions concerning alternative care should take full account of 
the desirability, in principle, of maintaining the child as close as 
possible to his/her habitual place of residence, in order to facilitate 
contact and potential reintegration with his/her family and to minim-
ize disruption of his/her educational, cultural and social life.25 
 
As used in these conventions, habitual residence is intended to 
                                                 
19 UCCJEA § 204(a) (“A court of this State has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the 
child is present in this State and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency 
to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”). 
20 See Dyer, supra note 1, at 636; Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: The Ha-
gue Children’s Conventions and the Case for International Family Law in the United States, 62 
FLA. L. REV. 47, 53 (2010). 
21 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 
1980,1343 U.N.T.S. 89, 19 I.L.M. 1501–05 (1980) [hereinafter Child Abduction Convention], 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt28en.pdf.  
22 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercoun-
try Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134–46 (1993) [hereinafter Adoption Convention], 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt33en.pdf.  
23 Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of 
Family Maintenance, Nov. 23, 2007, 47 I.L.M. 257 (2008), available at http://www.hcch.net/ 
upload/conventions/txt38en.pdf. See id. at arts. 18 and 20; S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-21 and S. 
EXEC. REP. 111-2 (Jan. 22, 2010). The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification in 
October 2010, but as of January 2011 Congress has not enacted implementing legislation. See 
Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Chairman Kerry: U.S. Senate Ap-
proves Hague Convention on the Int’l Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family 
Maint. (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/press/ 
chair/release/?id=066edb31-65a3-44b9-8c68-ed9ba917f413.  
24 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-
operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, Oct. 
19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1391 (1996) [hereinafter Child Protection Convention], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt34en.pdf. See id. at art. 5. The United States signed 
the Child Protection Convention in October 2010. Press Release, Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. 
Sec’y of State, U.S. Signature of the Child Protection Convention (Oct. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149860.htm. 
25 Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, G.A. Res. 64/142, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/64/142 (24 Feb. 2010), available at http://www.sos-childrensvillages.org/Documents/ 
SOSpublication-Guidelines-AlternativeCare.pdf. 
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raise a relatively simple question of fact, avoiding the many technicali-
ties that have surrounded concepts like “domicile” or “nationality.”26 
Nationality and domicile also imply a singular and stable link between 
an individual and a specific jurisdiction, and families that are interna-
tionally mobile tend to have a much more complex reality. The habi-
tual residence principle is largely neutral, reflecting the wider process 
of globalization and migration that gives rise to these family situations. 
By focusing on habitual residence, the treaties direct our attention to 
the choices that parents have made and the child’s lived experience.27 
In practice, determination of habitual residence can be difficult for 
children who have lived in more than one country, particularly when 
parents have different intentions and loyalties. Courts in two places 
may reach different conclusions as to which country is a child’s habi-
tual residence, or as to whether and how quickly the child’s habitual 
residence has changed.28   
Questions of belonging are also at the core of many relocation 
disputes, in which one parent seeks to move with a child across inter-
national borders, often to a place where the parent has stronger ties or 
a better living situation. These cases challenge authorities to weigh the 
arguments for maintaining a child’s residence against the possible ad-
vantages of a move, in circumstances that may involve serious conflict 
between the child’s parents and conflicting visions of the child’s iden-
tity. Whether or not relocation is permitted, the child may be left with 
strong ties to different countries and parents living far apart. 
The Children’s Conventions are carefully neutral on the question 
of citizenship, but experience with the treaties has revealed a number 
of tensions between the norms of habitual residence and citizenship. 
This is true under the Child Abduction Convention, which mandates 
the return of a child who has been wrongfully removed to or retained 
in a country that is not the child’s habitual residence.29 Courts in the 
United States applying the Convention have entered return orders for 
children who are U.S. citizens, rejecting the argument that this vi-
olates some right of citizenship.30 But popular and political debate 
                                                 
26 See Estin, supra note 20, at 53; E.M. Clive, The Concept of Habitual Residence, 1997 
JURID. REV. 137. 
27 See Rhona Schuz, Policy Considerations in Determining the Habitual Residence of a 
Child and the Relevance of Context, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 101 (2001). 
28 See the discussion in Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 990–92 (6th Cir. 2007). See 
generally Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence in Inter-
national Abduction Cases under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325, 3354–60 
(2009). 
29 Child Abduction Convention, supra note 21, art. 3. 
30 E.g., March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001). In the custody context, a court 
rejected the argument that an order allowing a custodial parent to remove a U.S.-citizen child to 
217] WHERE DO CHILDREN BELONG? 223 
 
over child abduction cases, here and abroad, often highlights the 
child’s citizenship.31 Courts consider questions of nationality or immi-
gration status explicitly in connection with the defense that is available 
when the removal or retention occurred more than a year before the 
proceeding was commenced and “the child is now settled in its new 
environment.”32 In some cases, in some countries, the child’s citizen-
ship—or factors such as culture, language, or tradition that stand for a 
similar claim of belonging—seems to play a role, particularly when 
the habitual residence norm would require sending a child away from 
his or her country of citizenship. As a practical matter, in parental ab-
duction disputes handled by consular officials, intervention is more 
likely to occur or succeed when the interests of a U.S.-citizen parent 
or child are at stake.33 Finally, the primacy of habitual residence over 
nationality in the Abduction Convention may be a factor in the reluc-
tance of some nations to participate. 
Immigration and citizenship issues are also centrally important in 
the practice of intercountry adoption under the Hague Adoption Con-
vention. This Convention requires that a child brought into a receiving 
state for adoption must be eligible to enter and remain permanently, 
but it does not require that the child must be eligible for citizenship.34 
It also does not address whether and to what extent children’s citizen-
ship or other ties to their country of origin should be protected after 
intercountry adoption.  
Practices of the member countries vary on these points.35 Children 
adopted abroad by U.S.-citizen parents acquire citizenship automatical-
                                                                                                             
another country violated the child’s constitutional rights. See Schleiffer v. Meyers, 644 F.2d 
656, 663 (7th Cir. 1981). But see Zaubi v. Hoejme, 530 F. Supp. 831, 838 (W.D. Pa. 1980) 
(abstaining and refusing to reach the constitutional question); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 296 
N.W.2d 490, 495–97 (N.D. 1980) (failing to decide if a child has a constitutional right to stay in 
the U.S.).  
31 For a political example, compare H.R. Res. 1326, 111th Cong. (2010), which addresses 
the problem of “abduction to and retention of United States citizen children in Japan.” with H. 
Res. 125, 111th Cong. (2009), which addresses international child abduction issues in terms of 
habitual residence rather than citizenship. See also Betty de Hart, “A Paradise for Kidnapping 
Parents”: Public Discourses on Parental Child Abduction in the Netherlands, presented at Lon-
don Metropolitan University, July 2, 2010 (manuscript on file with the author). 
32 Child Abduction Convention, supra note 21, art. 3. See, e.g., In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 
F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2009). See generally Catherine Norris, Immigration and Abduction:  The Re-
levance of U.S. Immigration Status to Defenses Under the Hague Convention on International 
Child Abduction, 98 CAL. L. REV. 159, 174–83 (2010). 
33 See generally LUKE T. LEE & JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 125-30, 
186-90 (3d ed. 2008). U.S. consular practice is addressed in part 7 of the State Department’s 
Foreign Affairs Manual, available at http://www.state.gov/m/a/dir/regs/fam/.  
34 Adoption Convention, supra note 22, at art. 5(c). 
35 William Duncan, Nationality and the Protection of Children Across Frontiers, and the 
Example of Intercountry Adoption, 8 Y.B. OF PRIV. INT’L L. 75 (2006). 
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ly upon entry to the United States,36 and only U.S. citizens can obtain 
visas to bring a newly-adopted child into the country.37 To help pro-
tect the integrity of the Hague Adoption rules, U.S. regulations define 
a child’s “habitual residence” with reference to the child’s country of 
citizenship.38 Thus, officials in the child’s country of citizenship must 
approve an adoption into the United States, even if the child has been 
habitually resident in a different nation. 
The complex linkage between adoption, belonging, and citizenship 
is also suggested by the practice in those countries that ask parents to 
send post-adoption reports back to the child’s country of origin con-
cerning the child’s development and welfare. Many adoptive parents 
work to support their children’s sense of belonging to their original 
home country, and some adoptees make significant efforts to reconnect 
with their birth places or families after reaching adulthood. Depending 
on the countries involved, adopted children may retain the citizenship 
of their country of birth, even after obtaining new citizenship through 
an intercountry adoption.39   
Although habitual residence provides a basis for jurisdiction in 
family law and international family law, we have not seen it as a suf-
ficient basis for extending political membership to children without ci-
tizenship or immigration status, even if they have lived virtually all of 
their lives within our borders and have only tenuous ties to their coun-
try of nationality. The debate in recent years over the DREAM Act 
underlines this point. Passage of this legislation would extend condi-
tional resident status to many children who entered the country before 
age 16, and create a pathway to citizenship for those who serve in the 
military or graduate from college.40 
 
                                                 
36 Child Citizenship Act of 2000, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2000). Children who immigrate for 
purposes of adoption as lawful permanent residents acquire citizenship automatically once the 
adoption is granted or recognized by state authorities. 8 U.S.C. §1431. See generally SARAH B. 
IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE FAMILY § 15:31 (2010 Up-
date). 
37 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(F), (G). See generally IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra note 36 
§_13:15 and §13:43. A lawful permanent resident may petition for admission of an adopted child 
under §1101(b)(1)(E), and may obtain a family preference visa for an adopted minor child under 
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A) (2006), but these procedures include a number of additional require-
ments and obstacles. See generally IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra note 36 §§3:3 and 13:2-13:14.  
38 A child present in the United States who is not a U.S. citizen is deemed to be habitually 
resident in his or her country of citizenship. See 8 C.F.R §204.3(k) (2008). 
39 See Duncan, supra note 35. 
40 For one iteration of this legislation, which passed the House but failed in the Senate in 
December 2010, see the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 
3992,111th Cong. (2010).  
217] WHERE DO CHILDREN BELONG? 225 
 
C.  Belonging Based on Presence 
 
In order to protect the interests of children, state courts assert ju-
risdiction over all children present within the geographic borders of 
the state. Both the UCCJEA41 and the Hague Child Protection Con-
vention42 provide for temporary emergency jurisdiction on this basis, 
and in these cases, courts may assume jurisdiction over families in-
cluding parents or children who are not (or not all) citizens or habitual 
residents.43 Under the “status exception” to the personal jurisdiction 
requirement,44 our courts conclude that they need not have personal 
jurisdiction over the child’s parents in child welfare cases, even when 
the proceeding may result in termination of parental rights.45 Constitu-
tional due process norms protect the rights of nonresident parents to 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, but this may prove difficult in 
cases with international dimensions.46  
Global children’s cases raise important issues of language, culture, 
and the need for casework and litigation techniques that can reach 
across international borders. Even locating the child’s parents or ex-
tended family members may prove difficult. These factors have impor-
tant implications for the parents’ right to due process and the larger 
goal of serving the best interests of the child. 
Despite the practical difficulties, courts and agencies working with 
global families should make careful efforts to provide real notice and a 
meaningful opportunity for a hearing to parents beyond their jurisdic-
tion. Agencies such as International Social Service can assist in locat-
ing and working with family members abroad, and devices such as the 
Hague Service and Evidence Conventions provide channels for judicial 
assistance.47 For cases involving children or parents who are foreign 
                                                 
41 See UCCJEA § 204(a). 
42 Child Protection Convention, supra note 24, at art. 5. 
43  See e.g., In re Nada R., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); see also supra 
note 18.  
44 See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–45 (1877); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977). But see May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). These cases are 
discussed in CLARK, supra note 15, and SCOLES, supra note 15. 
45 See e.g., In re W.A., 63 P.3d 607, 613–17 (Utah 2002) (citing cases); see also J.D. v. 
Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 923 So. 2d 303 (Alab. Civ. App. 2005); In re Thomas 
J.R., 663 N.W.2d 734, 738–49 (Wis. 2003). But see In re Claudia S., 31 Cal. Rptr.3d 697, 
703–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); In re John Doe, 926 P.2d 1290, 1296–98  (Haw. 1996) (reversing 
termination of parental rights of mother in the Philippines whose only contact with the state was 
agreeing to the father’s taking child there for a brief visit). 
46 See Ann Laquer Estin, Global Child Welfare: The Challenges for Family Law, 63 
OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
47 These are the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov.15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658 
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or dual nationals, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations man-
dates consular notice and access once a child is taken into care.48 Both 
the Child Abduction Convention and the Child Protection Convention 
provide tools for communication and cooperation between judicial and 
other authorities in Contracting States.49 In these cases, it is particular-
ly important for authorities to listen to the voices of children who are 
old enough to express their own sense of family and community ties. 
In child welfare cases, the most difficult challenge may be balanc-
ing our strong humanitarian impulses and our tendency to favor ties 
based on presence and recent care for a child against the substantial 
risk that the process will skew against children’s interest in family 
preservation and parents’ rights to make decisions concerning their 
children.50 This conflict appears most starkly in the context of special 
immigrant juvenile status, which opens a path to lawful residence and 
citizenship for undocumented children whose parental rights have been 
terminated.51 It is tempting to view termination of parental rights as 
beneficial precisely because it may allow a child to obtain lawful per-
manent residence and remain in the United States.52 The same humani-
tarian impulses extend to children beyond our borders who are caught 
                                                                                                             
U.N.T.S. 163, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 341 (1965), and the Hague Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. 
7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, appended to 28 U.S.C. § 1781, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 37 (1969). 
48 Done at Vienna 24 April 1963, entered in force 19 March 1967. UNTS v. 596 p. 261, 
ratified by the United States on 24 November 1969 [21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (1970).] 
Consular notice should be understood not simply as a procedural requirement, but as a practical 
means of initiating cooperation between governments. See Arteaga v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective 
and Regulatory Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 761 (Tex. App. 1996); E.R. v. Marion Cnty. Office of 
Family & Children, 729 N.E.2d 1052, 1056–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); In re Angelica L., 767 
N.W.2d 74, 96–97 (Neb. 2009) (Gerrard, J., concurring). 
49 Child Abduction Convention, supra note 21, at arts. 7, 15; Child Protection Conven-
tion, supra note 22, at arts. 29–39. 
50 See, e.g., In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793 (Tenn. 2007) (involving parents 
who spent years trying to regain custody of their daughter in a case that drew significant public 
attention); In re Sanjivini K., 391 N.E.2d 1316 (N.Y. 1979). Andrew Jacobs, Chinese and 
American Cultures Clash in Custody Battle for Girl, 5, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at A14; see 
also Amity R. Boye, Note, Making Sure Children Find Their Way Home: Obligating States Un-
der International Law to Return Dependent Children to Family Members Abroad, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1515 (2004). 
51 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 CFR § 204.11 (2009). See generally IGNATIUS & 
STICKNEY, supra note 36 §§14:84 – 14:87; Thronson, supra note 11, at 1003–13. Note that the 
SIJS statute was amended in 2008 by the Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthori-
zation Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). 
52 A child may be eligible for Special Immigrant Juvenile status under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(27)(J) if a state court determines that “reunification with one or both immigrant’s parents 
is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment or a similar basis found under State law” and 
makes a determination that it would not be in the child’s best interest to be returned to the 
child’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or the country of last habitual residence.  
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in war or natural disaster.53 In these cases, we need to take care so 
that our eagerness to embrace children who are victims of circums-
tances does not blind us to the importance of respecting and preserv-
ing their family ties.54 
 
II.  BELONGING FROM THE CHILD’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
Whether we frame the question of belonging in terms of citizen-
ship, residence, or presence, children’s membership is less stable and 
more contested than adult status, largely subject to adult decisions in 
which the child has little voice.55 The rules that define which children 
belong to the United States reveal more about adult rights than about 
children’s interests. We understand that an important privilege of adult 
citizenship or immigrant status is the ability to confer that status on 
family members, whether those family ties result from birth or adop-
tion. Adult citizens have mobilized the government, including Con-
gress and the State Department, to assist them in reaching out beyond 
our borders to establish new family ties through marriage and adoption 
or to protect their custodial rights.56 This doesn’t work in the other di-
rection, however, and the contrast between special immigrant juvenile 
status and the repeated failure of the DREAM Act makes this clear. 
For unparented, noncitizen children present in the United States, we 
extend the old idea of parens patriae and authorize the state, acting 
through a juvenile court, to extend permanent residency.57 For nonci-
tizen children in the United States with ongoing ties to their noncitizen 
parents, we do not offer access to formal membership, whatever the 
strength of their local ties.58 Their foreign parental ties effectively dis-
qualify them from citizenship.   
What would it mean to consider belonging from the child’s pers-
pective? Our constitutional tradition includes strong protection for pa-
                                                 
53 We have seen this recently in the evacuation of children from Haiti after the 2010 
earthquake and a generation ago in “Operation Babylift” at the end of the war in Vietnam. For 
litigation brought by family members seeking custody of children after the babylift, see Huynh 
Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978). See also Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 
F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975). 
54 See UNICEF’s Position on Inter-country Adoption, (July 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_41918.html.  
55 See, e.g., Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985); Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 
F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000). 
56 See Thronson, supra note 7, at 510–11 (pointing out that the Child Citizenship Act “was 
legislation prompted largely by concerns over how immigration law operated as family law, 
reaching into white, middle class families with U.S. citizen parents.”). 
57 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
58 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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rental rights, with the understanding that the state may intervene to 
protect children from harm.59 We do not have a similarly robust con-
stitutional tradition addressing children’s constitutional interest in pro-
tection of their family relationships.60 This is more clearly established 
in international human rights law, including the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)61 and the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),62 in provisions that reflect a 
broad global consensus consistent with many aspects of our own legal 
tradition.  
Both the ICCPR and the CRC recognize the family as the “fun-
damental group of society and the natural environment for the growth 
and well-being of all its members and particularly children . . . .”63 
Picking up on the idea that families are particularly important for 
children, the CRC Preamble states “that the child, for the full and 
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in 
a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and under-
standing.”64 Both conventions recognize the important roles of family, 
society, and the state in protecting children,65 and the CRC requires 
that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by pub-
lic or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be 
a primary consideration.”66 In addition, the CRC extends to a child 
“who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express 
those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the 
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity 
of the child.”67 
Several provisions in the CRC emphasize the importance of pro-
tecting a child’s relationships with both parents, even in international 
                                                 
59 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–69 (2000). 
60 Id. at 80–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
61 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. 
Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976 
(ratified by the United States in 1992). 
62 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25 (An-
nex), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted at 28 I.L.M. 1456 (1989). The United States has signed but not yet rati-
fied the CRC.  
63 Id. at pmbl. & art. 5. See also ICCPR, supra note 61, at art. 23(1) (“The family is the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
state.”). 
64 CRC, supra note 62, at pmbl. 
65 See ICCPR, supra note 61, at art. 24(1); CRC, supra note 62, at arts. 3(2), 5, 9, 18(1), 
19, 20. 
66 CRC, supra note 62, at art. 3(1). 
67 Id. at art. 12(1). 
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cases. Article 9(1) states that “States Parties shall ensure that a child 
shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except 
when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in ac-
cordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is 
necessary for the best interests of the child.”68  All interested parties 
must be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and 
make their views known. Seen from the child’s perspective, Article 
9(3) affirms the child’s right to maintain “personal relations and direct 
contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to 
the child’s best interests.” Under Article 10(2), this same right to 
maintain personal relations and direct contact applies to a child whose 
parents reside in different countries.69  
In the context of child welfare proceedings, Article 19 mandates 
that States Parties take appropriate measures “to protect the child from 
all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect of 
negligent treatment, maltreatment of exploitation, including sexual 
abuse . . . .” Article 20 addresses alternative care for children who 
are temporarily or permanently deprived of their family environment, 
or who cannot safely be allowed to remain in that environment. Not-
ing that such alternative care could include “foster placement, kafalah 
of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institu-
tions for the care of children,” Article 20(3) stipulates that in consi-
dering alternatives “due regard shall be paid to the desirability of con-
tinuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, 
cultural and linguistic background.” The importance of continuity is 
also reflected in the U.N. Guidelines for the Alternative Care of 
Children, which embrace the habitual residence principle for circums-
tances in which children are removed from the care of their parents.70 
Respect for the child’s “ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic 
background” is a corollary of the nondiscrimination principle in both 
the CRC and the ICCPR which prohibit discrimination on grounds in-
cluding “race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social ori-
gin, property or birth . . . .”71 Such respect also follows from the 
                                                 
68 Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (“Before a State may sever 
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that 
the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”). 
69 This may not apply in “exceptional circumstances;” but note that Art. 10(2) goes on to 
specify that States parties “shall respect the right of the child and his or her parents to leave any 
country, including their own, and to enter their own country.” See also Article 11, requiring 
States Parties to “take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return of children aboard,” 
such as the measures included in the Hague Child Abduction Convention.  
70 See Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, supra note 25. 
71 See ICCPR, supra note 61, at art. 24(1). See also CRC, supra note 60, at art. 2(1) 
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or oth-
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identity rights protected by the conventions, including the right to a 
name, a nationality, and “to know and be cared for by his or her par-
ents.”72 The conventions reflect particular historic concerns with the 
harms that result from a lack of birth registration or statelessness, and 
thus, they do not address the possibility of multiple nationality or con-
flicting identity claims, except to affirm that a child has a right to per-
sonal relations and direct contact with both parents.73  
The continuity principle is also embedded in the provisions on in-
tercountry adoption in CRC Article 21, which suggests that intercoun-
try adoption “may be considered as an alternative means of child’s 
care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or 
cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child’s country of 
origin.” In the adoption context, the question of where children belong 
is strenuously contested, and the language of Article 21 has been a 
source of controversy—particularly if it is read to suggest that institu-
tional care in the child’s habitual residence is preferable to adoption 
into another ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic setting. Many 
adoption advocates and experts in the United States prefer the lan-
guage in the CRC Preamble, recognizing that a child should grow up 
in a family environment.74   
For displaced children, including those who are accompanied by 
their parents and those who are unaccompanied, CRC Article 22 re-
quires states to take appropriate measures to ensure that children seek-
ing refugee status are eligible for such status and receive appropriate 
protection and humanitarian assistance. This includes the same protec-
tions that would be extended to adults under international law, as well 
as assistance in tracing parents or other family members to facilitate 
the child’s reunification with his or her family, if possible.75  
What do these principles of international human rights law suggest 
on the question of where children belong? Children belong to both of 
their parents, to their extended families, and to the communities de-
fined by their birth, upbringing and their ethnic, religious, cultural or 
linguistic identity. When children are separated from parents and fami-
ly members, or when those adults cannot safely or adequately care for 
children, it is the responsibility of the larger surrounding community 
to act on their behalf. When children’s lives reach across borders, 
                                                                                                             
er opinion, national ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status”). 
72 See CRC, supra note 62, at arts. 7, 8; ICCPR, supra note 61 at arts. 24(2), (3).  
73 CRC, supra note 62, at art. 10(2). 
74 See supra text accompanying note 63. 
75 If no parents or other family members can be found, the child should be accorded “the 
same protection as any other child permanently or temporarily deprived of his or her family en-
vironment for any reason.” Id. 
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when they belong in more than one place, we can make efforts to pro-
tect all of these important ties.  
A broad approach to belonging understands that children have 
many types of affiliation. It encourages cooperation and communica-
tion whenever possible, at every level, to protect children’s ties based 
on birth, family, residence, and citizenship. It suggests that we should 
act to protect all children within our borders, and respect all aspects of 
children’s identity, including those that reach into distant places. It 
suggests, in every case, that we should strive to hear what children 
have to tell us about where they feel that they belong. 

  
 
